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Abstract—In the era of Internet of Things (IoT), Malware
has been proliferating exponentially over the past decade. Tradi-
tional anti-virus software are ineffective against modern complex
Malware. In order to address this challenge, researchers have
proposed Hardware-assisted Malware Detection (HMD) using
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs). The HPCs are used
to train a set of Machine learning (ML) classifiers, which in
turn, are used to distinguish benign programs from Malware.
Recently, adversarial attacks have been designed by introducing
perturbations in the HPC traces using an adversarial sample
predictor to misclassify a program for specific HPCs. These
attacks are designed with the basic assumption that the attacker
is aware of the HPCs being used to detect Malware. Since
modern processors consist of hundreds of HPCs, restricting to
only a few of them for Malware detection aids the attacker. In
this paper, we propose a Moving target defense (MTD) for this
adversarial attack by designing multiple ML classifiers trained
on different sets of HPCs. The MTD randomly selects a classifier;
thus, confusing the attacker about the HPCs or the number of
classifiers applied. We have developed an analytical model which
proves that the probability of an attacker to guess the perfect
HPC-classifier combination for MTD is extremely low (in the
range of 10−1864 for a system with 20 HPCs). Our experimental
results prove that the proposed defense is able to improve the
classification accuracy of HPC traces that have been modified
through an adversarial sample generator by up to 31.5%, for a
near perfect (99.4%) restoration of the original accuracy.
Index Terms—Adversarial Attacks, Hardware Performance
Counters, Machine Learning, Malware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious software, informally known as Malware, include
Trojans, worms, spyware, adware, and computer viruses, etc.
They intentionally try to harm a system or leak sensitive pri-
vate information significant to the user. Traditional software-
based Malware detection techniques were used in the form of
Anti-Virus Software (AVS) to identify whether a program is
benign or malicious. Many AVS function by simply running
the program in a virtual machine and recording which Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces (APIs) are used [1]. Behavior flag
values are set by monitoring the functioning of the program.
The AVS then classifies the program as either Malware or
benign by trying to match the API usage with the behaviors
recorded with known data. As computing systems become
more complex, attackers have become conscious on the type
of attacks they launch [2]. In response, commercial AVS had
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to bolster their tools in order to enhance the system secu-
rity. This has caused AVS to induce significant performance
overhead to accommodate the large computational bandwidth
[3]. Moreover, AVS have been seen to be ineffective against
modern polymorphic and metamorphic Malware [2].
In order to address these challenges, researchers are explor-
ing alternatives to AVS for Malware detection. A promising
approach in this direction is the application of Hardware-
assisted Malware Detection (HMD) [3]. HMDs use dedicated
hardware features to distinguish between Malware and benign
programs. Hardware features are more difficult to jeopardize
compared to their software equivalents. Hardware Performance
Counters (HPCs) have emerged as a promising candidate
for Malware detection. HPCs are special registers built into
all modern processors that count significant low-level micro-
architectural features like branch misses, cache misses, and
CPU cycles, etc. They are beneficial for conducting power
analysis and tuning the performance of a computing system.
These counter values obtained from the system by executing
applications, can be used to train ML classifiers to predict
whether a program is benign or malicious, as seen in Figure 1a.
Recently, adversarial attacks are being developed on HPC-
based Malware detectors. Figure 1b visualizes one such attack,
discussed in [4], in which perturbations are introduced into the
HPC traces. It is assumed that the attacker doesn’t have a direct
access to modify the counter values in the HPC trace during
execution time. An adversarial sample generator predicts the
type of adversarial HPC patterns that needs to be created to
deceive the ML classifier. Once the adversarial HPC patterns
are estimated, the sample generator is deployed, that runs
along with a program to increase the count for certain HPCs.
The goal of this attack is to deceive the ML classifier into
incorrectly classifying programs, consequently resulting in an
eroding of trust in the system.
This paper counters the adversarial attack by establishing a
Moving Target Defense (MTD) that utilizes various ML clas-
sifiers deployed dynamically. The attack surface available to
the attacker is continuously altered, by continually modifying
the following parameters employed in Malware detection –
(1) the count of HPCs harvested from the processor, (2) the
specific set of HPCs to be provided as input to the HMD,
and (3) precisely, which classifier of the HMD is utilising
which HPC combinations to distinguish between benign and
malicious applications. As a result of this consistent parameter
variation, estimating those on the part of the adversary is
practically improbable, thereby jeopardising the planned attack
by exponentially increasing the attack complexity, as explained
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(a) HMD based on HPC Traces.
(b) Adversarial Attack to alter HPC Traces.
Figure 1: Process Flow Diagram of Malware Detection.
in detail in Section IV-E.
The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
• This work proposes a Moving Target Defense (MTD)
model that dynamically changes the attack surface by
modifying the count, the set of HPCs utilised, and the dis-
tinct classifier deployed for defending against adversarial
attacks on Malware detection, with tolerance to negligible
variation in classification accuracy (0∼3%).
• To illustrate the robustness of our proposed defense
mechanism, the paper demonstrates a thorough statistical
analysis with multivariate HPC and classifier combina-
tions, thereby yielding an infinitesimal probability for
reverse engineering the system (as low as 10−1864 for
a processor with 20 HPCs).
• The proposed MTD algorithm is evaluated against adver-
sarial attacks on HMDs detecting real life Malware. The
experimental results obtained by varying the classifiers
based on their algorithms, their performance statistics and
the specific set of HPCs utilised by a distinct classifier
corroborate our hypothesis of a robust defense strategy.
• The performance of the MTD algorithm when evaluated
against strengthened adversarial attack variants proves to
be resilient, thereby furnishing immense enhancement in
security to the processor in lieu of minimal area overhead.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
related work on the concepts of MTD as well as HPC-based
Malware detection. Section III outlines the adversarial attack
on Malware detectors that this paper is defending against. The
proposed MTD-based approach is presented in Section IV.
Section V presents the experimental results. Section VI dis-
cusses the impact of the proposed defense. Finally, Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Hardware Performance Counter-based Malware Detection
Malware tend to compromise the security of a system by
modifying, damaging, or gaining unauthorised access without
the knowledge of the user. Effects of these Malware can
range from stealing sensitive information, modifying system’s
functionality as well as performing Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks. In order to overcome the challenges of AVS, trusted
Hardware-based Malware Detection (HMD) techniques are
being proposed. These techniques tend to use low level micro-
architectural features in a processor, like HPCs, to differentiate
between malicious software and their benign counterparts.
One of the preliminary methods to detect Malware, using
HMDs based on HPCs was proposed in [5]. [2] developed an
algorithm that uses data from the existing HPCs and applies
ML techniques, namely Artificial Neural Network and K-
Nearest Neighbour, to classify between Malware and benign
applications. A virtual machine monitor, NumChecker, has
been presented in [6] to measure system call events from
HPC values in order to detect malicious kernel control-flow
modifications. Another approach of detecting anomaly in a
system has been introduced by [7], which does real-time
quantification of HPCs during execution to detect Malware in
cyber-physical systems. In [8], a low-cost HPC-based Malware
detection technique, ConFirm, has been proposed, which uses
comparison-based approach to detect firmware modifications
with simple control flows. [9] approached this domain by
designing Behaviour-based Adaptive Intrusion detection in
Networks (BRAIN). The proposed approach uses HPCs to
combine network statistics and modeled application behaviour
to detect Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks. Similar HPC-based Malware de-
tection techniques have been discussed in [10]–[13], which
protect the vulnerable systems from hostile software programs
and leaves the attacker with an onerous job of tampering
the trusted hardware architecture. Beyond HPCs, other HMDs
were developed by [14]–[17].
A lightweight node-level Malware detector and network-
level Malware confinement algorithm have been proposed
in [18], which uses a runtime Malware detector HaRM to
detect vulnerabilities based on HPC values on an IoT network
architecture. [19] developed an alternative HMD approach
by introducing 2SMaRT, a two stage ML-based classification
algorithm, which selects the best HPCs by feature selection,
and feeds them into the bi-stage classifier to efficiently detect
Malware applications. In [20], the authors had proven that
HMDs trained on dynamic traces can be successfully reverse
engineered and evaded through code injection in a malicious
program. Furthermore, the authors proposed Resilient HMDs
(RHMDs) which randomly switch between different detectors
to improve the resiliency to reverse engineering attempts.
However, as claimed by [4] and shown in [21]–[24], carefully
crafted perturbations into the input data can render RHMDs
modify the classifier output. Adversarial attacks on such Mal-
ware classifiers have been proposed in [4], which, unlike [20],
uses adversarial learning to alter the HPC values of a program
in parallel to its’ execution on the same thread in order to
deceive the ML classifiers of the HMD, thereby overlooking
a Malware that can potentially disrupt a system on the go. In
this paper, we propose a MTD-based approach that defends
against such adversarial attacks.
B. Moving Target Defence (MTD)
With the increasing threat to sensitive information, identi-
fying and removing security vulnerabilities are emerging as
need of the hour for modern computing systems. The never-
ending game between the attackers and defenders is what
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pushes the development of new defense techniques to address
the cyber-threats and thwart the attackers’ ploy. MTD is one
such promising cyber-defense strategy, that can potentially
challenge the attack capability on cyber physical systems.
This dynamic defense technique, originally conceived by the
Department of Homeland Security [25], constantly drives the
attack surface to evolve across multiple system dimensions.
Reducing or changing the attack surface dynamically confuses
the planned attack, decreasing the system’s susceptibility.
A fundamental MTD architecture called Mutable Networks
(MUTE) has been proposed in [26], enabling systems to dy-
namically change network configurations by host IP mutation,
in order to jeopardize adversarial attacks. Similar network
randomisation approaches have been proposed in [27], [28],
which slows down the hitlist worms on attacking the system.
[29], [30] approaches the dynamic defense strategy by ran-
domly shifting critical memory positions of certain system
components, thereby converting a malicious cyber attack into
a benign process crash. Instruction set randomisation-based
MTD approach has been proposed in [31] for safegaurding
networks against code injection attack. To create diversified
attack surfaces for internet services, a software diversification-
based dynamic defense model has been proposed in [32],
which creates a set of random virtual servers by configuring it
with a unique software mix, thereby complicating the attack.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Hardware Performance Counters in Malware Detection
HPCs are special purpose registers which keep count of
crucial low-level architectural events. The HPC values ob-
tained from executing a program can be employed for software
optimization and performance tuning of the cyber-physical
system. The number of accessible HPCs varies depending on
the processor. Prior research in HPC-based HMD has proven
that HPCs can be used in conjunction with ML classifiers to
efficiently detect malicious applications [2], [6].
1) Hardware Performance Counter Collection: This sub-
section explains how HPC data is collected for each appli-
cation, in order to design the HMD. Linux OS provides a
package called linux-tools-common which gives access to the
perf command. Perf is a performance analyzing tool that can
be accessed from the command line of the terminal to obtain
information on various hardware and software events related
to a program. The command perf list returns a list of all
the hardware and software events that perf can monitor. The
number and types of HPCs will differ based on the processor.
Executing the command perf stat with proper parameters for
constraints alongside the executable of the application will
provide the specified HPC values for that program. Distinct
devices support different quantities and types of HPC retrieval.
In this paper, we have retrieved four HPC measures per perf
command from the target processor.
2) Machine Learning Classifiers: In this section, a brief
overview of the conventional ML classifiers is provided, which
are deployed in the HMD [2], [4]. Other ML classifiers could
also be used, albeit, with a difference in classification accuracy.
A Decision Tree is an algorithm that builds a classification
model in a tree like structure. This ML classification model
uses a mutually exclusive if-then rule set, where the rules are
learned sequentially from the training data set one at a time
[33]. The structure of the tree is a top-down recursive approach
where the most dominant attributes are at the top. Decision
Trees can easily be over-fitted, so pruning is required to trim
unnecessary branches in the tree.
A Neural Network consists of a set of neurons and layers
that are interconnected such that each connection has some sort
of weight linked with it. When training the Neural Network,
the network will learn and adjust the weights in order to be
capable of predicting and classifying the correct label for the
input tuples. In a Neural Network, there can be many layers
in the model, and the number of hidden layers in the model
will depend on how complex the model has to be. Increasing
the number of hidden layers in the model will consequently
increase the time it takes to train the model. However, Neural
Networks have demonstrated good performance in practical
applications as they have a leniency towards data with noise.
3) Measurement metrics: Three different measurement
metrics are used to evaluate the performance of the ML
classifiers, namely: accuracy, precision, and recall. In this
section, we will furnish the formal definition for these metrics.
Accuracy is the ratio of the number of predictions that are
classified correctly to the total number of predictions, which
can be represented as:
Accuracy =
No. of (TP + TN)
No. of (FP + FN + TP + TN)
(1)
where, TP stands for True Positive, TN stands for True
Negative, FP stands for False Positive, and FN stands for
False Negative in Equation 1. For a ML classifier that tries to
classify whether an application is a Malware (positive class) or
benign (negative class), a True Positive would be a Malware
that is correctly classified malicious while a True Negative is
an application that is correctly labeled benign. Furthermore, a
False Positive would be a Malware that is incorrectly labeled
benign, while a False Negative would be a benign application
that is incorrectly labeled Malware.
Precision represents the proportion of positive
classifications that were correct.
Precision =
No. of TP
No. of FP +No. of TP
(2)
As an example, a ML model used in a HMD that has a TP
score of 10 and a FP score of 10 indicates that the precision
of the model is only 50%.
Recall is the proportion of actual positives that were
correct. In other words, recall is a measure of the fraction of
Malware samples that were classified correctly.
Recall =
No. of TP
No. of FN +No. of TP
(3)
As an example, the ML model has TP score of 10 and FN
score of 90, signifying that the model only correctly identifies
10% of the Malware in the dataset. Hence, its recall is 10%.
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B. Adversarial Attack on Hardware Performance Counters
While ML classifiers are robust to noise, it has been shown
that the output can be modified by introducing perturbations to
the input [21]. These perturbations are denoted as adversarial
samples. Recently, an adversarial attack in HPC-based HMDs
was proposed and implemented by [4]. The authors modified
the HPC values remotely by introducing additional instructions
to deceive the HMD into misclassifying the applications. This
adversarial attack consists of three parts, as follows:
1) Reverse Engineering HMD: Before the attack can be
fabricated, the attacker needs to reverse engineer the ML
classifier used in the HMD. First, a large data set of benign
and Malware programs are tested on the detector. The HMD
is used as a black box. The responses from the HMD are
recorded and are used as labels to train various ML models.
The ML models are then tested, and their output is compared
with the HMD’s output, from which the adversary is able to
deduce if the newly trained ML models are accurate enough to
be considered a reverse engineered HMD. The ML classifier
with the best accuracy is selected to perform as a reverse-
engineered version of the HMD.
2) Perturbations in HPCs: To compute the number of
additional perturbations needed to generate an adversarial
attack in the HPC trace, a gradient loss approach, similar to
the fast-gradient sign method, is utilized [4]. This approach
provides low overhead in terms of computational complexity.
For a ML model, a hyper parameter α is assumed. The input
and output of the ML models are represented as b and c,
respectively. Thus, the cost function of training the model
is C(α, b, c)[4]. Necessary perturbations to deceive the HMD
are obtained by the cost function gradient loss of this model,
shown in Equation 4.
Perturbations = b+ sign(∇bC(α, b, c)) (4)
In Equation 4, ∇b is the gradient of the cost function with
respect to input b while,  is a variable in range 0 to 1. This
is performed to keep the variation of input b undetectable. A
lower boundary constraint is instantiated on the model, since
HPC values cannot be negative.
3) HPC Modification: Adversarial attacks on HMD focus
on targeting specific HPC values. This adversarial attack [4]
focuses on manipulating branch-misses and LLC-load-misses,
which in turn alters the counter values for instructions and
branch-instructions. There is no direct access to modifying
the HPC values in a program. Instead, the adversarial attack
employs a benign program that is wrapped around an ap-
plication to be misclassified to generate the necessary HPC
values needed in the trace. The program to be camouflaged is
executed with the adversarial sample generator concurrently,
on the same thread and core of the processor.
In order to generate branch-misses in the HPC trace, Algo-
rithm 1 initializes a few variables such that the first variable is
the smallest in value. Dummy if statements that compare the
value of the smallest variable to the value of the other variables
are executed. It is already known that the if statements will
fail. Hence, the failure of these if statements will produce
the necessary branch-misses to append to the concerned HPC
Algorithm 1 Branch-miss Generation Psuedo-Code
Input: Application ‘App()’
Output: Adversarial micro-architectural events
1: #define int a, b, c, d, e
2: a < b < c < d < e
3: while a < Num To Get HPCs do
4: if a > b {—-do nothing—-}
5: if a > c {—-do nothing—-}
6: if a > d {—-do nothing—-}
7: if a > e {—-do nothing—-}
8: end
trace. The number of additional branch-misses to be introduced
is computed using the approach described in Section III-B2.
Similarly, introduction of LLC-load-misses into the HPC trace
can be accomplished by loading an array of a fixed size.
The values in the array are all flushed. The values are then
reloaded, and as a result, the LLC-load-misses increase in the
HPC trace. After the HPC sample predictor has predicted the
number of HPCs needed to be appended to the current HPC
trace, and the adversarial HPC generator has been executed
concurrently with the applications, the accuracy of the HMD
classifier is observed. The modified HPC traces are tested
using the reversed engineered HMD to verify the reduction
in detection accuracy.
C. Adversarial Attack Results
In replicating the attack, two ML classifiers, Decision Tree
and Neural Network, were trained on HPCs —branch-misses,
LLC-load-misses, instructions, and branch-instructions, simi-
lar to [4]. Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 show the results
for their trained accuracy, precision, and recall respectively, for
both classifiers. Before the attack, Decision Tree classifier had
an accuracy of 76.7% with precision of 76.5% and recall of
76.1%, while the Neural Network classifier had an accuracy of
78.1% with precision of 75.1% and recall of 75.3%. After the
attack, the Decision Tree had an accuracy of 53.2%, and the
Neural Network had an accuracy of 51.4%. The Decision Tree
and Neural Network accuracy dropped nearly 24% and 27%
respectively. This attack was triumphant in deceiving the HMD
to almost 50% accuracy, implying that trust in the system is
eroded, since it is at best a random guess.
Figure 2: Accuracy before and after Adversarial Attack.
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Figure 3: Precision before and after Adversarial Attack.
Figure 4: Recall before and after Adversarial Attack.
IV. MOVING TARGET DEFENSE
A. Motivation
The adversarial attack in Section III-B raises questions on
the credibility of the HMD in identifying a potential Malware
from the harvested HPC traces. Any modern processor sup-
ports multiple HPCs (up-to few hundreds [34]). During an
adversarial attack, only specific HPCs are being targeted by
an attacker. Therefore, a defense that constantly changes the
attack surface by modifying the HPC combinations possible is
robust in countering this adversarial attack. The proposed algo-
rithm perpetually modifies the following parameters employed
in Malware detection —(1) the count of HPCs harvested from
the processor, (2) the specific set of HPCs to be provided as
input to the HMD, and (3) precisely, which classifier of the
HMD is utilising which HPC combinations. A process flow
diagram for proposed MTD is shown in Figure 5.
Since, the MTD algorithm is contingent on multiple ML
classifiers with distinct HPC combinations, it is crucial to de-
termine which HPC is placed in which group, and eventually,
in which classifier. Section IV-B deals with this outline of
feature testing which returns the best performing HPCs among
those in a processor. Feature selection explains the concept
of clustering the HPCs based on the respective results from
the previous step of feature testing, as explained in Section
IV-C. Section IV-D presents the proposed MTD algorithm
with multivariate HMD classifiers. Finally, in Section IV-E,
we develop an analytical model to analyse the robustness of
our MTD algorithm against the adversarial attack framework
trying to reverse engineer the HMD.
Figure 5: Proposed Moving Target Defense.
B. Feature Testing
With a plethora of possible combinations for generating
potential ML classifiers with unique HPC clusters, the best
HPCs need to be utilized in order to obtain the highest
accuracy. Feature testing is used to address this challenge.
There are three different feature testing techniques employed
to assist in producing ML models with good accuracy, which
are briefly explained, as follows:
1) Univariate Selection: Univariate selection is the usage of
statistical tests that will assist in computing the features having
the best correlation with the output. For the experiments con-
ducted, python scikit-learn library was used, allowing access to
select K1 best classes that were executed with the chi-squared
statistical test to ensure positive HPC values. Assuming H
to be the set of all HPCs in a system, each individual HPC
in H will be harvested from executing multiple applications.
The data is used as input to the univariate selection testing,
furnishing a set of HPCs with high interdependence on output.
2) Feature Importance: Feature importance provides a
score for each of the input features (HPCs in our case), that
represents how significant a specific feature is towards the
output variable. A higher score establishes which features will
be more relevant and therefore, more prominent in incorpo-
rating in a ML classifier. Feature importance uses a decision
tree classifier model that eradicates unnecessary branches as
it is trained. This ensues a reduction in redundant data and
decision making from noise resulting in improved accuracy.
Similar to univariate selection, the feature importance of each
HPC is obtained by executing a number of programs. The data
is then used as input to the feature importance testing which
will return the scores for each HPC. A higher score signifies
a HPCs being more dominant in Malware detection.
3) Correlation Matrix with Heat map: In ML models, a
correlation matrix explains how the features relate with others
or a specified variable. Correlation matrices mapped onto a
heat map are effective in identifying the features with the least
and most impact on a specific variable. The heat map utilized
is color coded such that blocks that are more green have
1K is an user-defined positive integer.
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higher correlation while blocks that are more red have lower
correlation. Correlation can be used to understand whether
a feature increments or decrements the value of the output
variable. The correlation matrix obtained from the HPC data
for several applications will provide a heat map showing the
impact of each feature in the system.
Figure 6: Heat map for HPCs in Raspberry Pi 3.
C. Feature Selection
The three feature testing techniques described in Sec-
tion IV-B can now be applied in building the MTD. An
analysis can be preformed to determine the best HPC com-
binations for training a classifier from the results of the
three techniques. Since the goal of our proposed MTD is to
create multiple ML classifiers while maintaining acceptable
accuracy, the best HPCs should be paired with HPCs that
are average to ample. The adversarial attack that is being
defended against specifically targets branch-misses and LLC-
load-misses. Therefore, HPCs that are highly correlated can
be paired up with these HPCs that are being targeted to try
and bolster the accuracy of classification.
The heat map for the HPCs utilized in the experiment on
Raspberry PI 3 is shown in Figure 6. The more green a square
block is, the more correlation that HPC has towards the cor-
responding HPC. Additionally, each square block has a value
between 0 and 1. The higher the value is, the more correlation
it has and vice versa. Based on the heat map, potential HPC
combination pairs can be produced. For example, from the heat
map, HPCs cache-references, CPU cycles, and instructions
have high correlation with each other. This is proven by
the fact that they’re are all green when corresponding with
each other while they are red when corresponding with other
HPCs. Comparing univariate selection and feature importance
results validate that these HPCs have high correlation with the
output. Therefore, it would be ideal to combine these HPCs
together in a ML classifier to be utilized by the MTD. The
employment of these three feature testing techniques produces
high performing ML classifiers for MTD.
D. Analysis of Moving Target Defense
Once the best and optimal number of classifiers and HPCs
are selected, the MTD can be modelled. The MTD evaluates
the HPCs of a specific application (benign or malicious
software) and classifies them accordingly. Because HPC data
are collected in specific intervals (e.g. 10 ms), the HPC data
will be spilt into individual iterations. For each iteration, a
random number will be generated between a range of (1, N)
inclusive where N is the number of classifiers being utilized
in the MTD. The value of the random number generated will
determine which classifier will receive that HPC iteration data.
This specific classifier will predict whether the given HPC
iteration data corresponds to benign or malicious. Hence, every
time the HPC data is sent to the MTD, the classifiers utilized
will constantly be modified. Continually changing the attack
surface is the fundamental concept of the MTD. The MTD
inherits its name due to the fact that the HMD classifier
used to predict whether the program is benign or malicious
is perpetually altering, thereby obscuring the attacker from
the set of HPCs that the MTD will be evaluating on. This
entire MTD-based Malware detection approach is described
in Algorithm 2. For experimental purposes, to test and verify
the MTD implementation, every predict value returned was
checked to report the accuracy.
Algorithm 2 Moving Target Defense Design and Application
Input: Applications (Malware/Benign), k number of features
to be returned from univariate selection, C number of classi-
fiers to be created
Output: Number of ML Classifiers, MTD Accuracy
1: design of classifiers(){
2: #define int count of classifiers = 0
3: data = Get HPC Values from Applications
4: univar = UnivariateSelection(data,k)
5: featureimp = FeatureImportance(data)
6: hmap = heatmap(data)
7: while count of classifiers < C do
8: h’ = obtain high correlation HPC Set from hmap
9: for high (correlation values)h′ in hmap
10: if (univar)h′ and (featureimp)h′ is high
11: c(h’) = create classifier with h’
12: C = C + c(h’)
13: count of classifiers = count of classifiers + 1
14: hmap = hmap - h’
15: output ML classifiers(C)
16: end
17: }
18: application(){
19: #define int pass, fail
20: input = read testing data
21: while input do
22: n = RandomNumberGenerator (1, C)
23: if classifiern
24: {predictn (input)}
25: if predictn passed :
26: {pass++}
27: else {fail ++}
28: output MTDaccuracy = (pass / (pass + fail))
29: end
30: }
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E. Mathematical analysis of the proposed MTD
The proposed MTD model uses multiple ML classifiers
trained on different HPC clusters. As discussed in Sec-
tion III-A, the number of HPCs varies depending on the
processor. In addition, based on the processor, only a few
HPCs can be monitored simultaneously. The minimum number
of HPCs corresponding to each classifier used in HMDs is 1,
maximum being the number of HPCs that the CPU allows to
observe simultaneously.
In this section, we will explain the possible classifier
combinations that the model can obtain, given the number
of total HPCs available as well as the maximum number
of HPCs that a ML classifier can accommodate, using an
analytical framework. For simplicity, we assume only one type
of ML model, i.e., either Decision Tree or Neural Network.
The computation becomes even more complex when different
types of models are considered together. Let Ht be the total
number of HPCs in the processor, and X be the number of
counters that is used for a ML classifier. As stated earlier,
the model has constraints on the number of HPCs that can
be fitted per classifier, with the minimum value being 1.
Let Rmax be the maximum number of HPCs that can be
monitored simultaneously for a particular processor. Thus, the
value X ranges from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of
Rmax, all inclusive. The cumulative number of different types
of classifiers, each having unique set of HPC values can be
represented by the following Equation:
Total Classifiers =
(
Ht
1
)
+ ...+
(
Ht
Rmax
)
(5)
Equation 5 can be generalized as:
Total Classifiers (Nh) =
Rmax∑
i=1
(
Ht
i
)
(6)
where the total number of classifiers with unique HPC
combinations is denoted by Nh. X , Ht and Rmax are all
positive integers, where Rmax typically varies between [4, 7]
for all modern processors.
For a Raspberry Pi 3 with ARM Cortex-A53 CPU, the
value of total number of available HPCs, Ht is 20, and the
value of Rmax is considered to be 4. Therefore, the possible
cumulative classifier models with distinct set of counters for
such a processor is calculated from Equation 6 as:
Nh =
(
20
1
)
+
(
20
2
)
+
(
20
3
)
+
(
20
4
)
= 6, 195 (7)
Thus, there are 6195 potential classifiers to be used for the
proposed MTD model consisting of various HPC combina-
tions. With the linear increment in the number of HPCs, Ht,
the total number of classifiers with distinct counter combina-
tions Nh increases drastically. Figure 7 represents the non-
linear variation in the number of the ML classifiers with the
total number of accessible HPCs in a processor. For a CPU
with hundreds of HPCs, this value exceeds more than 4×106.
Now, we will analyse the different ML classifier combina-
tions possible for the MTD model, given a particular value of
Figure 7: Variation of the number of cumulative classifiers
with total HPCs.
Ht and Rmax. From Equation 6, we can obtain the number
of classifiers for such a combination as Nh. A defender can
choose any number of classifiers from this set. Let C be a
number of classifiers that can be selected from the set of
Nh classifiers. The MTD model behaviour requires at least
2 classifiers. The maximum number of classifiers that the
MTD model can choose is Nh. Therefore, the value of C
is constrained to 2 ≤ C ≤ Nh. The aggregate of the number
of such classifiers that can be picked together for MTD model
can be represented by :
Total Combinations (Nc) =
(
Nh
2
)
+ . . .+
(
Nh
Nh
)
(8)
where Nc denotes the total number of classifier combina-
tions, and Nh is the total number of classifiers with distinct
HPC clusters, Nc and Nh being positive integers.
Equation 8 can be rewritten as :
Nc =
[(
Nh
0
)
+
(
Nh
1
)
+
(
Nh
2
)
+
(
Nh
3
)
+ . . .+
(
Nh
Nh − 1
)
+
(
Nh
Nh
)]
−
(
Nh
0
)
−
(
Nh
1
)
(9)
Simplifying this using a Binomial expression, we obtain:
Nc = (1 + 1)
Nh −
(
Nh
1
)
−
(
Nh
0
)
= 2Nh −Nh − 1 (10)
Equation 10 furnishes the total number of ML classifier
combinations Nc for the MTD, given the total number of
classifiers Nh, obtained from Equation 6.
As seen from Equation 7, for a Raspberry Pi 3 with 20
HPCs, the total number of classifiers Nh is 6, 195. Using the
Nh value in Equation 10, we obtain approximately 7.6×101864
combinations that the defender can use to model a MTD.
Figure 8 shows the variation of the number of classifier
combinations against the total number of HPCs present in a
CPU, where Nc increases exponentially with increase in Ht.
These extensive classifier combination values eventually
establish the defense against the attacker trying to reverse
engineer the classifiers. An adversary attempting to break
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Figure 8: Number of Possible Combinations based on Varia-
tion of Total HPCs.
into the system has to know exactly what HPCs a particu-
lar classifier is using. But, with the dynamic attack surface
variation established by the MTD, it is nearly impossible for
the attacker to extract the relevant attack information; the
probability of which is 17.6×101864 , which is approximately
0.13157× 10−1864, for even a small processor with 20 HPCs.
This probability is not contingent on what classifier algorithm
the MTD model is utilising, thereby yielding a consistent de-
fense strategy against the adversarial attacks by complicating
the detection model.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
Recently, [35] examined some perils of using HPCs for
Malware detection, in which, the authors argued against the
use of Virtual Machines (VM) for designing the HMD, since
HPCs in a VM differ from those in a bare-metal. Therefore,
for developing a proof of concept of our proposed MTD
methodology, we eradicated the need for a VM by conducting
tests on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, which utilizes an ARM
processor, and HPC values were collected using perf 4.18.
Based on the data in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the ML models
utilized in the MTD were Decision Tree (DT) and Neural
Network (NN) classifiers. These ML models were written
in Python3 using scikit-learn. The Malware samples were
acquired from Virusshare [36], and the benign programs
include the MiBench [37] benchmark as well as different
sorting and computational algorithms. 300 Malware and 300
benign programs were executed on the Raspberry Pi, and the
HPC values were harvested. For each HMD, a classifier was
trained on HPC branch-instructions, HPC branch-misses, HPC
instructions, and HPC LLC-load-misses, which are the HPCs
used by [4]. Training these classifiers on the HPCs allows us
to obtain the initial accuracy before the adversarial attack.
The adversarial attack for branch misses and LLC-load-
misses were written as C code, which were then ran together
with the programs to be camouflaged through a python wrap-
per. 50 new Malware samples, which were not included in
the training data set, were tested on each trained classifier to
prove that the accuracy would go down. These 50 Malware
were first tested on each classifier with no HPC perturbations
to show that the ML models trained could label them with
satisfactory accuracy. Subsequently, these 50 Malware samples
were executed again with the adversarial HPC generator, and
each classifier was tested to demonstrate reduction in accuracy.
Finally, the 50 programs with HPC perturbations were
executed through the proposed MTD to prove that the defense
could recover the lost accuracy. In the MTD, two classifiers
using the same ML algorithm were implemented using HPCs
Branch-instructions, Branch-misses, Bus-cycles, and Cache-
misses for one classifier, and HPCs Cache-references, CPU-
cycles, and Instructions for the other classifier. These HPCs
were picked based on the heat map in Figure 6, followed
by further analysis using other feature selection methods
described in Section IV-C, which shows that these HPCs have
good correlation with each other. Two different versions of
the MTD were tested where the only difference was the ML
algorithm used for the two classifiers.
B. Results
The initial training accuracy, without any perturbations, for
the DT and NN classifiers was 76.7% and 78.1%, respectively.
The Malware detection accuracy for the 50 Malware programs
with no perturbations was 76.3% and 76.4% for DT and NN,
respectively. This shows that each classifier has competent
accuracy in properly classifying the applications. The accuracy
for the 50 Malware with perturbations in HPC traces for each
classifier was 53.2% for DT and 51.4% for NN which is
expected as the attack should lower the accuracy. However,
the accuracy for the 50 Malware with perturbations running
through the MTD was 70.9% using DT and 75.9% using NN.
Comparison of accuracy, precision, and recall for the two ML
classifiers for each of the three cases, i.e., before attack, after
attack, and after MTD are shown in Figure 9, Figure 10,
and Figure 11 respectively. It is observed that the adversarial
attack reduced the classification accuracy, precision, and recall.
Nevertheless, the MTD was successful in improving all these
values. The DT was restored by nearly 17.7% which is 92.4%
of the original accuracy. The NN was restored by nearly 24.5%
which is 97.2% of the original accuracy.
Figure 9: Accuracy with Moving Target Defense.
1) Impact of number of classifiers used in MTD: Figure 12
depicts the variation in classification accuracy when the num-
ber of classifiers change. The MTD was tested using the
50 Malware with perturbations, but the number of classifiers
was incremented in each round. The additional classifiers
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Figure 10: Precision with Moving Target Defense.
Figure 11: Recall with Moving Target Defense.
were chosen using methods described in Section IV-B and
Section IV-C. As the number of classifiers increased, the
accuracy diminished. This is because, certain HPCs are better
correlated than others for training the ML models. Therefore,
assuming HPCs cannot be repeated; as the number of classi-
fiers increases, the more non-optimal HPCs are integrated into
the MTD. Consequently, the accuracy will decrease. However,
the defense will improve considering utilization of additional
classifiers results in attackers having an arduous time in reverse
engineering the system as they will not know which HPCs the
ML classifiers are using, as evident from Equation 10. From
Figure 12, the MTD NN was reduced from 75.98% accuracy
to 65.5% as the number of classifiers was increased to five.
The MTD DT accuracy was reduced from 71% to 61.5% as the
number of classifiers was incremented to five. Thus, selecting
just two classifiers for MTD furnishes the best accuracy.
2) Classifier Priority: In this experiment, similar to Sec-
tion V-B1, five classifiers were chosen. The MTD was tested
using the 50 Malware with perturbations, but instead of ran-
dom classifier selection, the best classifier was given priority
in the MTD. Similar to Section V-B1, variation of accuracy
with an increase in the number of classifiers is shown in
Figure 13. In this case, the best classifier was utilized every
other run, while the other classifiers are chosen randomly using
MTD, from the set of the remaining four classifiers. Figure 13
shows that while the accuracy still reduces as the number
of classifiers is incremented, the accuracy doesn’t plummet
as quickly as in Figure 12. The classifier with priority is
able to increase the accuracy since there is less testing data
Figure 12: Classifier versus Accuracy Trade-off.
being sent to classifiers with inferior accuracy. The MTD
DT accuracy reduced from 71% to 65.8% as the number of
classifiers was incremented to five. The MTD NN accuracy
reduced from 75.98% accuracy to 71.5% as the number of
classifiers was increased to five. Compared to Figure 12, where
Decision Tree furnished 61.5% and Neural Network furnished
65.5% accuracy with five classifiers, it is demonstrated that
selecting the classifier with highest priority can improve the
classification accuracy. Hence, if more than two classifiers are
used for the MTD, it is better to use a priority-based selection.
Figure 13: Assigning Priority to the Best classifier.
3) Mixing Classifiers: In this experiment, the MTD was
tested using the 50 Malware with perturbations, but the ML
classifiers were mixed. We revert back to a MTD using two
classifiers for this experiment. The two ML classifiers are
created using different sets of HPCs. Previously, each MTD
would only be run with models of the same ML algorithm.
For our experiments, we modify the order in which the
classifiers are built. For example, as shown in Figure 14, in
the first experiment, the HPCs Branch-instructions, Branch-
misses, Bus-cycles, and Cache-misses are used for the DT
classifier, while the HPCs Cache-references, CPU-cycles, and
Instructions are used for the NN classifier. In the second
experiment, a reverse order is followed. These two classifiers
are then chosen randomly using MTD. Figure 14 shows the
accuracy on using these two sets of classifiers. Because the DT
and NN classifiers have accuracy values in the 70% to 76%
range, mixing their models results in 70.9% to 75.3% accuracy.
Thus, the detection accuracy is affected depending on how the
ML classifiers are designed. The capability to mix different
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ML algorithms allows for an increase in the complexity of
reverse engineering the MTD. However, the final accuracy of
the system of mixed classifiers depends on which HPCs are
used in designing a particular type of classifier.
Figure 14: Mixed Classifiers in MTD where X represents the
classifier with HPCs Branch-instructions, Branch-misses, Bus-
cycles, and Cache-misses and Y represents the classifier with
HPCs Cache-references, CPU-cycles, and Instructions.
4) MTD Resilience: Previously, the adversarial attack re-
duced the accuracy of the ML classifiers to roughly 50%. To
demonstrate the resilience and durability of the MTD, 50 Mal-
ware were executed with a strengthened Adversarial Sample
Generator (ASG). Figure 15 shows experimental results for
the adversarial attack bolstered through extra branch-misses.
Initially, a trained NN classifier had a detection accuracy of
78.1%. A set of preliminary experiments were conducted,
where the ASG was set to generate branch misses less
than ten million. Under such circumstances, the adversarial
attack was incompetent to reduce the HMD accuracy signif-
icantly, thereby resulting in an unsuccessful attack scenario.
Consequently, three sets of experiments were executed with
HPC measures of branch-misses ranging from ten million to
forty million, as generated by the ASG. The NN accuracy
dropped from 78.1% to 51.4% for ten million branch-misses,
49.4% for twenty million branch-misses, and 46.2% for forty
million branch misses. Therefore, the addition of supplemen-
tary branch-misses was successful in reducing the accuracy.
However, these HPC traces were then ran through the MTD
utilizing only NN classifiers where the accuracy reverted back
up to 75.9% for ten million branch-misses, 75.8% for twenty
million branch-misses, and 77.7% for forty million branch-
misses. This is equivalent to a 24.5-31.5% increase, which is
a 97.1%-99.4% restoration of the original accuracy. The MTD
is robust against specific HPC modification adversarial attacks,
because the switching of ML classifiers results in inspections
of different HPCs for efficient Malware detection.
VI. DISCUSSION
We presented a MTD-based approach to counter the ad-
versarial attack on HPC traces that misclassifies a Malware
into a benign application and vice versa. The aforementioned
attack ideally alters particular HPC values of a Malware
or a benign program to replicate the characteristics of their
Figure 15: MTD Defense on Adversarial Attack Variants.
respective antipodes, in order to mislead the HMD to produce
an ambiguous label. In [4], the adversary selects HPCs branch-
misses and LLC-load-misses as target, which has dominant
low values, significant of an application being a Malware.
The attack then introduces dummy loops to boost up those
values in order to mimic the corresponding values for a benign
program, which in turn, ramps up the measures for instructions
and branch instructions, deceiving the HMD.
But, Malware also tend to generate exorbitant values for
some HPCs, making it impossible for the adversarial attack to
reduce them altogether, since the adversarial HPC values can
never be negative. Furthermore, it is highly implausible for the
adversarial sample generator to inject perturbations in more
than two to three distinct sets of HPCs concurrently, due to
constrained resources associated with processors deployed on
edge devices. This is where lies the major contribution of the
proposed MTD model. Our proposed model takes into consid-
eration multiple HPCs in a processor by dynamically changing
the attack surface. Any inconsistencies in any of the counter
measures owing to the executed application gets immediately
arrested by our robust algorithm, thereby aiding the Malware
detector to perform as expected. The theoretical model is
corroborated by our mathematical analysis and experimental
results. The proposed model can be generalized for any other
ML classifier used in a HMD. This MTD algorithm incurs
an area overhead for the ML classifiers while implementing
on hardware. However, as seen from Figure 12, a total count
of two classifiers provide optimal accuracy, in presence of
perturbations. Therefore, in the worst case, two ML classifiers
are implemented. Since this area overhead incurred is minimal
compared to the processor area, such defense mechanism
eventually will be beneficial for the CPU to protect itself from
probable vulnerabilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
HMDs can improve system security by addressing the
challenges of anti-virus software. In this paper, we proposed
a MTD algorithm to combat HPC modification adversarial
attacks in HMDs. The introduced defense strategy involves dy-
namic evolution of the attack surface, precisely the parameters
deployed in HMD for Malware detection, thereby restoring
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its anticipated performance. Experimental results show that
the MTD can bolster the detection accuracy by up to 31.5%,
and nearly restore the original accuracy on the HPCs that
have been modified by an adversarial attack. An analytical
model has been introduced proving that the probability of
an attacker guessing the HPC-classifier combinations in the
MTD is extremely low, near to impossible (in the range of
10−1864 for a system with 20 HPCs). In the future, we plan to
explore utilization of different ML models to be employed in
the MTD such as Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression, Support
Vector Machines, and Random Forest. The effect of adversarial
attacks on these algorithms and their robustness in the MTD
will be analyzed.
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